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                                              ABSTRACT  
The term “anti-Americanism” has become common coinage in public and academic debate, the 
more so since the election of President G. W. Bush, and especially since 9/11. Yet little is known of 
its causes and impact. Defining it as opposition to US policy, and using 2003 and 2005 
Eurobarometer data we examine individuals` attitudes to the US in five policy dimensions for EU 
members. We find that over a third of EU voters either approved or disapproved of the US in all 
five dimensions. We also find there are differences in attitude to US policy related to age, policy 
preferences and nationality.  And, although anti-Americanism is associated with a preference for 
greater European independence, perhaps surprisingly it is also linked to a desire for a less federal 
and hence less powerful Europe. 
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            Anti-Americanism and public opinion in the European Union 
 
  “....in Europe, there has been an anti-Americanism that at once can be casual but also 
insidious." Barak Obama, April 2009. 
 
1. Introduction 
After the election of President G W Bush and especially after 9/11, it seemed to some that the 
United States (US) adopted radically changed attitudes to its allies and to its enemies. Allies 
were to be led, not accommodated; alliances were temporary and purpose-specific. Enemies 
might be preemptively attacked, their regimes changed, and if possible democratized. There was 
a new isolationism of perspective along with a wider, more vigorous projection of US power 
(Iwama 2004).  
 
Unsurprisingly this apparent major change created a European crisis of trust, which is now 
discussed openly by politicians, commentators, and scholars. We want to examine some solid 
data that could help us determine the strength of European citizens` views of the US at this 
apparent point of change, and to allow an analysis of their different dimensions, and the 
characteristics of those who held them. In particular we want to explore whether opposition to 
US policies is accompanied by a desire for a more integrated and powerful EU, which might 
become a countervailing economic and political power to US influence. This leads us to try to 
link – at least empirically – two hitherto separate literatures: anti-Americanism and attitudes 
towards EU integration. 
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The data is drawn from the Eurobarometer March-April 2003 and October-November 2005 
surveys for the European Commission. In the 2003 survey, during which the Iraq War began, 
some 23,000 citizens in the then 15-member union were questioned, using face-to-face home 
interviews in their national language. In the 2005 survey more than 29,000 citizens in the now 
27 country EU were surveyed. The sample frame was those aged fifteen and above, but we 
wanted to study the views of those who could influence policy - that is voters - so we analyze 
those aged eighteen and over.  The surveys’ multi-stage random probability design ensures a 
representative sample with respect to metropolitan, urban and rural areas. For each interviewee, 
the data included age, sex, educational level, income, religion and nationality, plus some 
attitudinal variables. 
 
We focus on the answers to two areas of questioning: 
-Whether the respondent felt the US played a positive, negative, or neither a positive nor 
negative role in a) the search for world peace; b) the fight against terrorism; c) the fight against 
world poverty; d) the protection of the world environment; and e) world economic growth. 
-Respondents` views on independent EU defense, security, and foreign policies, and their links 
to US foreign policy. 
 
We aim to answer three basic questions: (1) is there clear evidence for the existence of anti-
Americanism; (2) if so, is anti-Americanism random or is it linked to certain personal 
characteristics; and finally (3) if anti-Americanism exists, what does this imply for popular 
support for the European Union? 
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Section 2 of this paper discusses the definition of anti-Americanism and surveys the literature 
on it, as well as voters` attitudes to European Integration. Section 3 provides the theoretical 
basis for our analysis. Section 4 gives the results, and section 5 summarizes our conclusions. 
              
2. Literature review 
Here we define anti-Americanism, and review the existing literature on its extent and causes. 
 
2.1 Defining anti-Americanism 
As a term it has been widely and loosely used. What is needed is a definition that corresponds to 
observable phenomena. For example Spiro (1988: 120) defines anti-Americanism as “a persistent 
pattern of gross criticism of the main values of the US Constitution.” This is both too vague: the 
values need to be defined; and too specific: why is it confined to the Constitution?  Alternatively 
Krastev (2004: 6-7) defines anti-Americanism as “opposing any policy simply because it is 
endorsed by the US government”. This is not a good choice both because it is a causal definition: it 
includes the cause of the phenomenon under investigation, and operationally it relies on a probably 
hard to distinguish preference distinction. 
 
A more tractable definition focuses on opposition to specific American policies (Berman 2004). 
This leaves the motivation for the opposition open for investigation. Therefore we define anti-
Americanism as “specific or general opposition to American policies”. Such a definition is value 
neutral, and its presence is possible to test. We extend the term to include policy effects. So a view 
that the re-election of President G W Bush made the world more dangerous could be viewed as an 
anti-American sentiment, possibly determined by views of the likely effects of his policies. Those 
holding such views may be irrational, mistaken, prejudiced or entirely otherwise. But what is 
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interesting is the frequency of such views, the personal characteristics accompany them, and how 
they link with the interviewees` opinions of the EU. 
 
2.2 Attitudes towards the US and its policies 
Opinion poll evidence for European anti-American views in the early years of this decade, 
summarized by Linn (2004) reveals a growing negative view of the US, though with marked 
differences across European states, and more positive views in recent EU members. Kohut (2003: 
1-2) quotes a 2001 State Department survey “where 78% of Germans said they had a favorable 
view of the U.S. That fell to 61% in our (Pew Research Center) 2002 poll – and to 45% in the 
survey conducted (in spring 2005). Opinion of the U.S. in France has followed a similar track: 62% 
positive in 1999-2000, 63% (in 2004)…and 43% (in 2005).”   
 
But according to both Linn and Kohut, although EU public opinion has changed, the US-EU “value 
divide” is not widening. Linn (2004: 13) defines “basic values” as “views regarding fundamental, 
life and death issues that are embedded in traditional culture and do not vary quickly or significantly 
over time.” Such values might be the roles of the individual and the state; belief in God; or the 
necessary conditions for a just war. These he contrasts with “`public opinion` (which although it) 
refers to views and perceptions mainly on matters of current politics or events…” can and generally 
does “also cover and reflect basic values” (ibid.). These authors believe that the recent growth in 
anti-Americanism reflects changing European public opinion rather than a basic value change. 
 
But even if there has been no profound change in European values, some American commentators 
have taken a very combative line. For example Ceaser (2003) claims that anti-Americanism in 
Europe influenced Islamic terrorists. He traces anti-Americanism back to the eighteenth century 
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biological degeneracy thesis that all species, including human beings, thrived less well in the New 
World. By the late eighteenth century this then dominant view also appeared in a political variant 
that asserted the inferiority of the American political system because it was not grounded in 
tradition. For Ceaser (2003: 16) anti-Americanism “…is a construct of European thought…anti-
Americanism makes rational discussion impossible, it threatens the idea of a community of interests 
between Europe and America. Indeed it threatens the idea of the West itself.” 
 
One does not have to accept Ceaser`s extreme account to agree that America`s power, and hence its 
pervasive influence, has created the preconditions for widespread distrust of its motives. The US 
response to 9/11, and especially the invasion of Iraq, produced widespread European opposition. 
The more radical criticism went beyond policy disagreement and purported to examine alleged 
flaws in the American psyche that led to the violent and intimidating behavior that, some argued, 
has marked America since its inception (Sardar and Davies, 2002, 2004).  
 
The degree of distrust of America varies across European countries, most plausibly because of past 
contacts. However opinions are constantly evolving. Germany and France provide two examples. 
Although relatively pro-American, Germans have recently become more distrustful. Berman (2004: 
29-30)  claims ‘…there is a specific German continuity from pre-1989 Communist anti-
Americanism to post-Communist anti-Americanism, which has been particularly relevant, given the 
role of the former Communist Party – the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) – and its ability to 
influence the larger German political landscape.’ Other influences he cites are the ‘…association of 
Americans with ‘capitalism in a negative sense’; a ‘…pre-democratic anti-Americanism (that) finds 
expression in contempt for aspects of American mass culture’, and a post-democratic anti-
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Americanism…driven by resentment that the United States has been unwilling to cede sovereignty 
to the structures of international governance.’  
 
But French opinion is arguably the most anti-American. Meunier (2005:1) argues that “France is the 
country with the deepest, most sedimented reservoir of Anti-American arguments”  Toinet (1988), a 
French commentator sympathetic to the US, argued that after its critical help to the US in the War 
of Independence, France looked in vain for a ‘special relationship’ with the new state. In fact 
relations were characterized by intermittent tensions. For example France interpreted the 1898 
American attack on the Spanish Empire as a threat to all European empires. The US did not forgive 
France its First World War debts. Roosevelt initially favored Vichy over the Free French, and 
wanted a retributive postwar military government for France. But even such an unpromising legacy 
cannot explain the severity of some criticisms. Toinet`s explanation is that French commentators 
see a clash between the ideals of French civilization and American advocacy of its view of 
democracy, a system which for them incorporates an unacceptably rapacious and uncaring form of 
capitalism (Todd 2003). 
   
2.3 Citizens` attitudes to European integration 
Hass (1958) argued that supporting EU integration involved a cost-benefit calculation; a view 
empirically supported by Gabel (1998) and Sanchez-Cuenca (2000). Kritzinger (2003) presents an 
alternative view: attitude formation based on ‘national context theory’, emphasizing the political, 
economic, cultural and historical contexts in which attitudes developed. The key role of national 
concerns in European parliamentary elections supports this hypothesis (Franklin et al. 1995). 
Lacking specific EU knowledge voters use their evaluations of domestic politics (Anderson 1998). 
Much of their general EU information is also filtered through national politicians. 
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Ordinary citizens may link their views of national and EU politics in two ways. First the ‘equal 
assessments’ hypothesis suggests that people view both similarly, perhaps because national 
politicians also participate at inter-governmental meetings (Anderson, 1998). A second view sees 
national and EU politics as alternatives, even rivals: those disillusioned with one may see the other 
as an alternative way forward. But those satisfied with their national politics may see the EU as a 
more distant and hence less accountable rival.  
 
Using 1994 Eurobarometer data Kritzinger (2003) concluded that politically the EU is seen as an 
alternative to the perceived inefficiencies of the nation state, though in some countries the domestic 
economic situation and support for the EU were positively linked.  
 
Hooghe (2003) demonstrates a gulf in attitudes between elites and public opinion. On core 
sovereignty issues such as immigration and defense, national elites and even more so the EU 
Commission elites favor integration more strongly than the public. The public are more positive to 
integration in areas such as market regulation and redistribution. Hooghe detects a clear distinction 
between issues of principle and specific issues, with the public more favorable to the latter. There 
are three reasons why people might wish power transferred to the EU from member states. First, the 
appropriate assignment level is the more efficient. If there are economies of scale, externalities or 
transaction costs, the argument for EU powers becomes stronger. Second, EU and national 
redistribution policies may differ, and some domestic voters may favor the EU policy in preference 
to the national policy. However, organizing public services efficiently at an EU level may be 
difficult. Third, EU expansion may generate more prosperity but more uncertainty, as increased 
capital and labor mobility produce greater job insecurity. This uncertainty can be reduced by social 
policies, and Hooghe notes that support for the Europeanization of social policies, which soften 
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market impacts, is 18% higher than for other policies. If these policies involve significant 
redistribution then they may also be attractive to the electorate for the second, redistributive reason. 
On the other hand Gabel and Anderson (2002) argue that voters divide systematically between pro-
EU, who tend to lean to the Left, and pro-national governments, who tend to be on the Right. 
  
3. Preference Theory 
3.1 Attitudes to the USA 
We assume the basic determinant of the `i’th person’s approval of American policy with respect to 
the j`th issue (Aij) depends on the gap between their policy preferences (Pij) and the USA`s position, 
P*j. The policies we examine: poverty, terrorism, peace, the environment and world growth, and 
their approval levels are assumed continuous. A higher value indicates a preferred policy. So for 
poverty, increasing development aid increases Pj*. Similarly, lower CO2 emissions increase Pj*.  
Hence: 
 
Aij =fij(Pj*)         (1) 
  
The determinants of fij(.) depend on individuals` preferences, partly proxiable by their socio-
economic characteristics. Specifically we assume fij(.) to have the  form: 
 
Aij = β0 + β1(Pj* - Pij)         (2) 
 
Pij is the critical level of US performance on policy j that signals approval, i.e. if Pj* > Pij then the 
`i`th individual approves of the US on this issue: otherwise they disapprove. If issues directly affect 
someone their preferences most likely reflect their socio-economic characteristics (Xi). So 
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environmental concern may rise with income, provided policy does not increase motoring costs. For 
issues like world poverty, individuals` attitudes may depend on the US aid/GDP ratio compared to 
the desired ratio for their own country. These may also be linked to income. For the environment or 
world poverty where knowledge may influence preferences, education may be influential. Hence: 
 
Pij = Xiβj + uij          (3) 
  
 uij is a stochastic error term. Within this framework we can define ‘anti-Americanism’ in several 
ways. It might impact directly on the linear transform fij(.) linking approval to the policy gap in (1). 
It could directly affect the preferences in (3), as traditional party supporters may follow their party`s 
domestic line on the same issues. If perceptions deviate from reality it could even affect perceptions 
of US policy. 
 
However incorporated, if sentiment towards the US is distributed systematically according to socio-
economic characteristics, policy preferences or country of origin, it will consistently impact on that 
variable, across issues where it would not be otherwise apparent. So we would expect, in the 
absence of systematic ‘anti-Americanism’, people with given characteristics to exhibit a range of 
approval responses across policies. But if we find that specific respondent characteristics, for 
example gender or national origin, are consistently associated with negative attitudes, this would be 
evidence of systematic ‘anti-Americanism’. We will assume the simplest functional form for anti-
Americanism and include it as an ‘additive constant’ in (2): 
  
Aij = β0j + β1(Pj* - Xiβj+ uij) + β2jΨi       (4) 
 
  12 
Ψi reflects sentiment towards the USA, and β2j denotes its impact upon approval for American 
policy on the ‘j’th issue. Ψi may vary according to socio-economic characteristics, policy 
preferences or country of residence. For example if Ψi were age, people with personal memories of 
World War II or the Cold War may be more pro-American than others. We therefore assume that Ψi 
= Xi∏. Thus expanding (4) we obtain: 
 
Aij = β0j + β1Xi(∏ - βj) + β1Pj* 
 
+ β2jΨij + β1uij     (5) 
 
βj varies from issue to issue, whereas ∏  does not. Hence a consistent sign on a component of Xi is 
evidence of anti-Americanism, or more precisely systematic variations in support for the USA 
across issues. Even then the impact of a specific characteristic could vary, although it might be 
associated with anti-Americanism, if the sign of (∏ - βj) varies across policy issues due to 
variations in βj which may dominate ∏ - βj. But a consistent sign suggests anti-Americanism, 
provided the policy issues are sufficiently varied to allow for differences in βj. 
 
Our binary data are coded one for approval and 0 otherwise. Approval can be estimated using probit 
regression. The probability an individual will ‘approve’ of the USA with respect to policy j is: 
 
Pr(Yij=1) = Pr[β0j + β1Xi(∏j - βj) + β1Pj* 
 
+ β2jΨij + β1uij] > 0 
                = Pr[uij > -[β0j + β1Xi(∏j - βj) + β1Pj* 
 
+ β2jΨij]/β1 
                       = 1-Φ(-[β0j + β1Xi(∏j - βj) + β1Pj* 
 
+ β2jΨij]/β1)    (6)           Φ is 
the cumulative density function relating to the normal distribution. 
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3.2 Attitudes to European integration 
We follow Hass (1958) and others and assume those who favor greater European integration feel 
that they will benefit from it – individually or altruistically. Their views are uninfluenced by the 
appropriate service delivery level (Oates, 1999), because this is a given. Also our policy areas do 
not include public services, which is where the arguments of fiscal federalism have most relevance. 
International influence and defense capability increase with economic size. Hence a single EU voice 
has more impact than any member country, and possibly more than the sum of all members. But 
integration entails a loss of sovereignty and a country may become committed to support and 
finance policies it opposes. The costs may be direct or indirect - such as support for a fellow EU 
member in an international dispute. 
 
The expected benefits of greater EU policy co-ordination might be individual, altruistic, or civic 
duty inspired, involving concern for the individual’s country and also the whole world. So: 
 
Wi = αiWii + αCWiC + αWWiW       (7) 
 
Where Wii is individual i`s self interest based welfare, WiC the welfare of ‘the country’ and WiW 
world welfare. αi, αC and αW are the individual`s weights for these three different welfares. The 
subscript i on WiC and WiW recognises people may have different perceptions of country and world 
welfare. αi, αC and αW could be normalized to sum to one, and often we might expect  αiWii> αCWiC 
> αWWiW. We assume that all three types of welfare are functions of the individual’s socio-
economic characteristics (Xi), the power of the US (PUS) and of the EU, (PEU) e.g.: 
 
WiC = WiC(Xi,PUS,PEU)        (8) 
  14 
EU power might affect individuals: for example through regional transfers. Socio economic 
characteristics could influence perceptions of country and world welfare: for example education 
increases awareness. The dependence of individual, country and world welfare on how EU power 
affects national governments is implicit in (8). The individual will favor a stronger EU if:  
 
dWi/dEUi  = αi∂Wii/∂PEU + αC∂WiC/∂PEU + αW∂WiW/∂PEU + (αi∂Wii/∂PUS + αC∂WiC/∂PUS + 
αW∂WiW/∂PUS)∂PUS/∂PEU >0      (9) 
 
Socio economic factors can have various impacts on dWi/dPEU. Although the weights, αi, αC and 
αW, may vary with household income, age and education, we ignore this.  There may be resource 
allocation costs, for example for a common defense, and individual attitudes may partly depend 
upon socio economic characteristics. A willingness to bear such costs is a demand for a (public) 
good that like others varies with income. Unlike attitudes to the USA, location may be important, 
for arguably the transfer of power to the EU entails a greater sacrifice for citizens of the capital city. 
This is consistent with Caplanova et al`s (2004) study of Central and Eastern Europe citizens` 
attitudes to EU and NATO membership. 
 
 The impact of ∂Wii/∂PEU will also vary directly with the individual’s circumstances. For example, 
EU equal opportunities legislation has influenced the retirement age for UK women.  ∂WiC/∂PEU 
will be proxied by country fixed effects, together with socio-economic variables and trust in EU and 
national governments. It might be thought that ∂WiW/∂PEU would be common across all 
individuals in all countries. But individuals` perceptions of this impact may differ. We shall model 
these by socio-economic variables, by trust in the EU and by perceptions of the EU’s image. 
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Critical in (9) is the sign of ∂PUS/∂PEU. If negative, an increase in EU power reduces US power. 
For example the euro is challenging the dominant position of the dollar. But if EU power supports 
US power, most likely in foreign policy, then the sign is positive. Given the case we have examined 
we would expect that if (αi∂Wii/∂PUS+αC∂WiC/∂PUS+ αW∂WiW/∂PUS) <0 then the individual will 
favor an increase in countervailing EU power if ∂PUS/∂PEU<0. In the following empirical analysis 
we will proxy (αi∂Wii/∂PUS+αC∂WiC/∂PUS+αW∂WiW/∂PUS) by the aggregate index of US 
sentiment. So an individual with consistently negative views of American policies would interpret 
increasing US power as reducing their welfare. We expect anti-American sentiment to generate 
support for a stronger EU where it challenges US power, and vice versa.  
 
4 Analysis  
We have already described the Eurobarometer sample frame and interview procedures. Our probit 
regressions use the survey`s attitudinal and characteristics data to explore their inter linkages. The 
variables are defined in an appendix. In the 2003 survey, the individuals` incomes were proxied by 
the mid point of their income range. Relative income was the ratio of this to the country average. In 
the 2005 survey, data on income was not available, but data on  individual personal circumstances 
in the recent past and anticipated financial circumstances in the future were available. Attitudes to 
the US relate to five policy areas: peace, terrorism, poverty, the environment, and world growth. 
Attitudes to the EU are measured in relation to voter support for a greater co-ordination of defense 
policy and foreign policy, an EU military rapid reaction force, a common crisis response position 
and greater independence of foreign policy from the USA. In the 2005 survey, data on the last three 
were not available, but there was information on support for an EU constitution. The constitution 
apart, these are predominantly foreign policy and defense issues which could be addressed by inter-
state agreements. Hence greater EU co-ordination implies a reduction in national sovereignty.   
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Insert Table 1 about here 
 
4.1 Voters’ views on US policies 
Table 1 reports attitudinal variables. The first five columns of Table 1 record negative views of the 
US with respect to peace, terror, poverty, environment and growth. The alternative measure (not 
shown) includes positive views and respondents with neither positive nor negative feelings. For 
example in 2003 29.9% of the Belgian respondents did not have negative views of the US on peace. 
Overall the survey shows considerable hostility to US policies on peace, poverty and the 
environment. The most positive views are for US contributions to world growth, and fighting 
international terrorism. 
     
There are considerable inter-country differences. In 2003 Over 80% of Greek views were negative 
in all five policy areas, but UK and Irish views were consistently relatively favorable. French 
evaluations were negative but Danes and Italians were more positive. Belgium, Germany, Spain, 
Austria and Finland all had average negative percentages on US policies of 55% or higher. But 
Swedish, Portuguese and Dutch opinion was more evenly balanced. The unweighted all-country 
averages are highest for environment (67% dissatisfied), peace (60% dissatisfied) and poverty (59% 
dissatisfied) Growth (42% dissatisfied) and terrorism (39% dissatisfied) were more favorably 
perceived.  
     
The results for 2005 largely confirm these trends although within the EU15 there was some decline 
in hostility in some countries including Greece and France, but this has been countered by increased 
disfavor in countries such as Italy and Ireland. Dissatisfaction on US terrorism policy rose to 49%, 
  17 
and overall dissatisfaction rose to 57% from 53%. However, more noticeable was the lower level of 
hostility of many of the new EU entrants, Romania and Estonia excepted. Their overall level of 
dissatisfaction across the five policy areas was only 38%. Superficially it would appear that the 
expansion of the EU has made it collectively more favorable to the USA.  
 
Insert table 2 about here 
 
Table 2 gives the regression results for US policies. Our focus is not on individual coefficients, but 
patterns of significance that can be equated to anti-Americanism or pro-Americanism. The 
dependent variable is the view of the USA’s role with respect to each of the five policy dimensions 
– whether negative or otherwise. Logged variables allow for nonlinearities. The use of squares of 
ages allows different age cohorts to have different reactions, perhaps reflecting the history of US 
involvement with their countries. In evaluating the impact of the variables it should be borne in 
mind that they reflect both attitudes to the USA and the specific issue.  
 
Table 2 shows  
1. Women are less favorable than men to the USA with respect to peace and terrorism in both 
sets of regressions, tend to be less favorable on growth, but are more favorable on the 
environment.  
2. More educated people tend to be more hostile on poverty and environment and in the more 
recent data set on all policy issues.  
3. In 2003, with an increase in income, hostility declines on terrorism, but given the other 
variables is otherwise insignificant. In 2005, those who have personally fared badly in the recent 
past or expect that their financial position will worsen, tend to be more disapproving   
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4. For all the issues, apart from growth in 2005, older people are less disapproving than middle 
aged people. In both years, for the environment and poverty issues, disapproval increases with 
age across the age range. For the other issues we tend to observe an inverted U shaped pattern 
with a peak of disapproval for most issues for people in their forties. 
 
Both income and age impacts might have been expected, with richer voters and those with 
memories from the height of the cold-war more supportive. The US`s association with 
capitalism may attract the wealthy. Approval for US policies is highest for those growing up  in 
the period 1949-69 - the ‘cold-war generation’ – a period when the US was seen as the protector 
of Europe against Communism.  
 
Attitudinal variables are significant along several dimensions. Concern with terrorism tends to 
increase support for US policies on terrorism, world peace and growth in both years and in all 
policy dimensions in the original sample. Hence over time this appears to be less of a defining 
issue. However, the environment remains a key issue. On almost every policy issue in both years, 
those who feel the environment to be important are more disapproving of the USA. But even more 
so than the environment attitudes to big business are a defining issue. Without exception mistrust of 
big business is highly significant in increasing disapproval for the USA. 
 
The country coefficients reflect differences in attitudes compared to the default case - here Finland. 
The choice of Finland has no substantive impact on the results. Choosing a different country would 
have changed the country dummy coefficients, but not their relative ordering. These country fixed 
effects are not shown in the tables, but  Figure 1 reflects their average values. Hence given all other 
variables, including trust in big business, it reflects an attitude to the USA which characterizes the 
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country as a whole. Of the EU15 the least favorable are Greece, Spain and France. The UK, 
Netherlands and Sweden are more favorable. In general the new entrants are more favorable to the 
USA with the exception of Estonia and Romania. But it is clear on this that ‘new Europe’ is less 
disapproving of the USA than ‘old Europe’.  
  
Insert Figure 1 about here 
   
Insert Table 3 about here 
. 
4.2 Voters’ views of EU policies 
Table 2 shows respondents` attitudes towards EU policies. Unweighted country averages show that 
in 2003 only 9% were opposed to an EU foreign policy independent of US foreign policy. Finns 
(4%) and Greeks (5%) were the least disapproving; the Danes (17%) were the most disapproving. 
Other foreign and defense issues follow a similar pattern. Overall, 20% oppose an integrated EU 
foreign policy and 18% an integrated defense policy. In 2005 these figures were 22% and 18% for 
the original EU15. For the full EU27 the figures are slightly lower at 20% and 15% respectively. 
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
     Many EU voters have negative attitudes to the USA in all five policy areas, from peace to 
growth. Figure 2 shows the sum of all responses as coded in the data index. Hence a zero score 
signals positive attitudes in all dimensions: true for 8.8% of respondents in the 2003 sample. But 10 
signals wholly negative attitudes: true for 28.8% of respondents. By 2005 the proportion of positive 
signals amongst the original EU-15 countries had fallen slightly, indicating that there was little sign 
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of declining anti-Americanism. But when we turn to the EU-27 counties, in 2005 we find slightly 
more support and less hostility to the USA. The expansion of the EU to include countries primarily 
from Central and Eastern Europe appears at least at first to have initially lessened hostility to the 
USA within the EU as a whole. 
 
In Table 3, we focus on the impact that attitudes to the USA have on support for European 
integration. In 2003 support for EU independence of the USA increases with the level of education, 
and is greater for men. The variable, ‘summed USA attitudes’, combining attitudes along the five 
dimensions of support for the USA as in Figure 2, is also significant, so the less favorable are 
respondents` views of the USA, the more likely are they to support an independent EU foreign 
policy. Table 3 also shows that for EU positions on foreign and defense issues in 2003, including a 
rapid reaction force, men are more favorable towards an expanded EU role. Northern European 
countries are the most hostile, though the UK is favorable to a rapid reaction force. Replies again 
reflect both attitudes to integration and willingness to project military force. On the issues, concern 
with the economy is consistently associated with support for a stronger EU. Also the `summed USA 
attitudes` variable is significant for EU foreign policy and defense policy co-ordination, the creation 
of a rapid reaction force and for holding common positions  in the face of crises. So increased 
negativity to the US reduces support for closer European integration. Finally, mistrust of national 
governments is evident, and is linked to reduced support for a stronger EU. Hence it seems mistrust 
of either the USA or the national government breeds mistrust of the EU. In the more recent sample 
we have data on attitudes to defense and foreign policy but not the other issues. However, there is 
now a question on the EU constitution. The results are largely consistent with those for 2003, 
including with respect to education, attitudes to the economy and the USA.  In addition those whose 
personal situation had deteriorated or who expected it to deteriorate tend to be more hostile to a 
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strengthening European union. Distrust of big business also, in general, reduces support for EU 
integration, although more so in 2005 than in 2003. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
We defined anti-Americanism as consistent opposition to US policy. Our three questions were: (i) 
does anti-Americanism exist in the EU, (ii) is it linked to respondent characteristics and attitudes, 
and (iii) what is its impact on support for greater EU integration? There is strong evidence of anti-
Americanism linked to age, gender, policy preferences, national origin, and in particular those who 
mistrust big business. The latter is strongly suggestive that a root cause of anti-Americanism is anti-
capitalism. If so the financial crisis of 2008/9 is unlikely to increase support for the USA, 
notwithstanding the considerably greater popularity of President Obama compared to that of his 
predecessor. 
 
In ‘old Europe’ ‘pro-Americanism’ is found in the UK, Italy, Ireland and possibly Sweden. France, 
Greece and Spain stand out in having consistently more unfavorable attitudes. France has possibly 
the most ancient and complex set of anti-American sentiments. Greek hostility dates back to WWII 
and US anticommunist intervention. Spanish hostility can be traced back to 1898 with the Spanish-
American war which saw Spain lose considerable territory to the USA. However, attitudes to the 
USA are considerably more positive in ‘new’ than in ‘old Europe’. EU expansion does appear to 
have made it, collectively at least, more pro-USA.  
 
Excepting Ireland this pattern of country support also matched explicit initial support for the Iraq 
war. It may also impact on American multinationals and US exports (Anholt and Hildreth, 2004). 
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The lesson is that a "hard power" victory can come at the expense of a "soft-power" defeat (Nye, 
2004).  
 
European hostility to America also has implications for the EU. We showed that EU voter anti-
Americanism leads to a demand for less dependence on the US, though not for an EU to rival 
America. Indeed the reverse is the case – disapproval of America was not linked to a desire for 
greater European defense and foreign policy integration, nor for an EU constitution. EU voters who 
feel American policies have been bad for the world do not want a more powerful EU.  
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APPENDIX: DATA DEFINITIONS 
Male:  female=0, male=1. 
Age: Respondent`s age in years. 
Education Age individual finished full time education.  Coded: 1, <16 years; 2, 16-19 years; 3, >19 
years.   
Self-employed, unemployed, house person, manual worker: Coded one if the respondent fell 
into any of these categories otherwise zero. 
Household income relative to country average Ratio of household income to average income in 
respondent's country. Income data uses a fifteen-point scale. Its proxy was the mid point of the 
range corresponding to the scale point. 
Attitudes to the USA Responses to the question "In your opinion would you say that the United 
States tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor negative role regarding 
..." Answers were coded 0 (positive), 1 (neither positive nor negative) and 2 (negative). Don’t 
knows were omitted. The questions covered (i)world peace, (ii)the fight against terrorism, (iii)the 
fight against world poverty (iv)protecting the world environment and (v)growth of the world 
economy. 
Summed USA attitudes The sum of the responses to the five questions on attitudes to the USA. 
Independent of USA Responses to the question “The European Union already has a Common 
Security and Foreign Policy and a European Security and Defense Policy. There is now a debate 
about how much further these should be developed. Do you tend to agree or disagree with each of 
the following statements? European Union foreign policy should be independent of United States 
Foreign Policy”. Coded 0 (tend to agree), 1 (don’t know) and 2 (tend to disagree). 
European Defense and Foreign Policy Responses to a question on whether the EU should have 
common defense and foreign policies. Coded 0 (for), don’t know (1) and against (2). 
Military Reaction Force Response to a question on whether the EU should have a military rapid 
reaction force for international crises. Coded 0 (for), don’t know (1) and against (2). 
European Constitution Coded 0 if the respondent was in favor for a constitution for the European 
Union, don’t know (1) and against (2). 
Attitudes to Terror, the economy, defense and the environment: a question that asked for the 
two most important issues then facing the country; from a choice of twenty four. Coded 1 if 
mentioned and zero otherwise. 
Trust in big companies and also in the national government. Coded 1 for no trust, and zero for 
trust or do not know. 
Situation 5 years: coded 1 if the individual believed their personal situation had improved over the 
previous five years; 2 if was unchanged; and 3 if it had worsened. 
Finances will improve. Coded 1 if the individual expected their household financial position to 
improve over the next five years, 2 if was expected to stay the same, and 3 if it was expected to get 
worse. 
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Table 1: Attitudes to US and European Integration 
  
  US:       European Integration: 
2003                 Peace    Terror  Poverty     Environ-   Growth  Foreign       Defense   RMF     Crisis      Independent 
      ment  policy policy   USA 
Austria 65.7  47.4  62.9  70.5  47.6  22.5  25.8  15.0  15.9   12.3  
Belgium 70.1  42.4  60.7  69.4  51.9  13.4  10.7  11.8    7.3   11.5  
Denmark 36.3  20.1  52.1  74.2  25.1  32.1  31.2  10.3  14.9   16.5  
Finland 71.5  37.3  62.9  68.1  38.6  33.2  38.8    9.4  15.9   5.0  
France 75.9  50.7  73.6  79.5  58.7  20.9  14.4  10.1    6.0   9.3  
Germany 74.2  38.7  61.1  73.9  40.8  13.3    9.8  13.3    6.7   7.1  
Greece 91.2  80.7  86.5  85.9  80.3  10.8    8.3    8.4    6.8   4.3  
Ireland 44.0  32.7  39.1  43.5  25.8  18.5  26.6  23.7    9.6   6.3  
Italy 53.3  32.1  46.0  50.0  30.7    8.9    5.9  10.6    5.2   10.0  
Luxembourg 49.5  35.6  57.9  72.2  40.8  11.3    5.3    5.8    5.3   10.4  
Netherlands 47.6  27.0  60.1  73.5  39.1  16.6  14.7  10.9  10.4   11.7  
Portugal 54.7  40.0  53.0  58.5  42.2  15.1    9.4  17.0    8.0   10.1  
Spain 71.3  51.6  64.0  65.1  47.0  11.9    9.9  19.1    7.8    6.7  
Sweden 52.0  26.3  59.7  69.5  26.0  34.3  36.7    7.1  10.8     7.6  
UK 34.1  18.4  40.0  56.2  29.8  35.8  29.2  15.1  12.6   11.5  
 2005 Peace Terror Poverty    Envir-  Growth  Foreign  Defense  Constitution 
                  onment   Policy    Policy      
Austria 65.4  51.5    61.2      71.9   35.9   26.9     27.9   28.5  
Belgium 58.3   46.3    51.1      55.0   38.4   21.0     16.0    19.7  
Denmark 47.4   33.4    55.9      75.9   18.6    31.9     25.6    40.3  
Finland 54.7   39.5    59.7      76.9   22.6    38.8    33.1   34.4   
France 67.9   61.7    66.6      69.6   51.3   15.6     10.9   12.8  
Germany 62.9   42.8    60.2      76.4   35.6   17.8     11.4    19.2  
Greece 76.6   52.2    71.5      80.9   34.2   15.0      9.8    18.3  
Ireland 68.1 50.7     61.8    75.1  35.6  33.7   34.7      41.7 
Italy 67.0   50.3    74.2      83.3   53.6    20.8    12.6    21.5  
Luxembourg 53.5   45.6    42.6      54.4   25.4    16.9     22.4   13.8  
Netherlands 42.2   36.8    42.9      42.8   33.9   15.5    13.6   15.5  
Portugal 62.4   50.9    61.2      78.3   42.4   17.5      7.5    19.8  
Spain 90.5   83.0    83.6      79.7   76.8   22.3    18.5   28.0  
Sweden 62.5   55.4    55.3      60.3   39.4    18.4    14.0    14.3   
UK 46.4   33.2    60.5      78.9   34.9   25.2     14.7   32.8  
Bulgaria 48.7   30.7    35.2      44.2   26.4   19.5      8.4    16.4  
Cyprus 47.2   35.0    45.9      72.9   32.5    35.3     29.8    32.6  
Czech 57.7   53.1    57.9      70.0   48.8   20.7    19.1    18.4  
Estonia 77.4   67.5    70.8      69.1   62.0   9.76      6.2   12.6  
Hungary 29.3   17.7    28.1      41.6   15.3   24.6      9.2   31.2  
Latvia 42.3   28.0    19.8      36.9   13.2   12.4      6.2   14.4  
Lithuania 44.4   32.0    37.2      42.4   23.2    14.5      8.9   8.20  
Malta 45.4   32.9    25.4      34.9   19.8   13.0       5.2   14.3  
Poland 27.3   17.2    13.9      17.5   13.4      9.6      6.1    13.3  
Romania 66.0   61.1    59.6      69.1   41.5   15.7    10.3    12.4  
Slovakia 29.2   24.5    24.2      29.7   19.0    20.0    16.4   17.0  
Slovenia 37.6   21.7    28.5      31.7   13.1    11.8      8.1   18.9 
Figures show percentages (i) disapproving of the US on the different policy issues and (ii) not  
in favor of greater European co-operation or independence from the US, or fearing crises. 
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Table 2: Attitudes to the US with respect to: 
Variable Peace Terror Growth Poverty Environment  Peace Terror Growth Poverty Environment 
2005         2003        
Age 0.0036 9.50E-04 0.0075** 0.0169** 0.015**  -0.0085** -0.0096** 0.0042 0.0073* 0.0083* 
 (1.56) (0.42) (3.27) (7.45) (6.28)  (2.75) (3.19) (1.36) (2.38) (2.56) 
Age
2
/100 -0.0074** -0.0052* -0.0069** -0.0184** -0.0149**  0.0049 0.007* -0.0038 -0.0108** -0.0091** 
 (3.11) (2.20) (2.90) (7.73) (5.94)  (1.49) (2.18) (1.16) (3.29) (2.64) 
Male -0.0981** -0.1467** -0.0182   0.0182   0.1169**  -0.183** -0.1926** -0.0962** -0.0255 0.0623** 
 (6.32) (9.51) (1.18) (1.18) (7.19)  (8.61) (9.29) (4.62) (1.21) (2.79) 
Education 0.0508** 0.051** 0.0178* 0.0429** 0.0774**  -0.0115 -0.0118 -0.0311* 0.0382* 0.0898** 
 (5.78) (5.86) (2.05) (4.92) (8.42)  (0.72) (0.75) (1.98) (2.38) (5.34) 
Self- -0.059* 0.0318 0.0643* -0.0077 -0.0597  -0.0745 0.0638 0.0122 0.0254 -0.0626 
employed (1.98) (1.07) (2.21) (0.26) (1.93)  (1.88) (1.64) (0.32) (0.64) (1.50) 
House -0.056* 0.0408 0.0863** -0.0052 -0.0702*  -0.0568 0.0194 -0.0021 -0.0651 -0.076 
person (2.00) (1.47) (3.10) (0.19) (2.42)  (1.52) (0.53) (0.06) (1.74) (1.95) 
Unemployed -0.0729* -0.0934** 0.0097 -0.1056** -0.1438**  -0.0267 0.0022 0.0772 -0.0098 -0.0537 
 (2.28) (2.93) (0.31) (3.32) (4.32)  (0.59) (0.05) (1.75) (0.22) (1.13) 
Manual -0.0972** -0.0868** -0.0146 -0.0922** -0.1664**  -0.0559* -0.0146 0.0275 -0.1061** -0.1339** 
 (4.75) (4.28) (0.72) (4.54) (7.79)  (2.05) (0.55) (1.03) (3.91) (4.69) 
Situation 0.0173 0.0355** 0.0715** 0.0253* -0.0133       
5 years (1.70) (3.51) (7.07) (2.49) (1.24)       
Finances 0.0213** 0.0311** 0.0323** 0.0223** 0.003       
will improve (3.17) (4.68) (4.87) (3.35) (0.43)       
Household                  -0.0626  -0.1779**         -0.0531    -0.0098           0.0514 
income                   (1.16)  (3.40)            (1.00)     (0.18)              (0.91) 
Attitudes 
Terror    -0.0738** -0.0728** 0.0697** -0.0265 -0.0291  -0.1877** -0.103** -0.1467** -0.1754** -0.1859** 
 (2.78) (2.73) (2.61) (1.00) (1.02)  (5.95) (3.27) (4.66) (5.58) (5.72) 
Economy 0.0074 -0.0444** 0.0203 0.0167 0.0327  0.021 -0.0285 -0.0288 0.0147 0.0739** 
 (0.42) (2.57) (1.18) (0.97) (1.80)  (0.84) (1.18) (1.19) (0.60) (2.81) 
Defense  0.0071 -0.028 -0.0075 0.0521 0.0489  0.1621** 0.1272** 0.0925* 0.062 0.1544** 
 (0.13) (0.52) (0.14) (0.95) (0.84)  (3.63) (2.94) (2.16) (1.40) (3.23) 
Environment 0.1092** 0.2148** -0.0545 0.2132** 0.34**  0.1961** 0.2026** 0.1376** 0.274** 0.2795** 
 (2.62) (5.18) (1.32) (5.03) (7.17)  (3.90) (4.22) (2.82) (5.30) (5.01) 
Trust 0.2602** 0.2439** 0.2474** 0.2537** 0.2863**  0.2652** 0.2244** 0.2885** 0.334** 0.3214** 
Big Business (17.21) (16.17) (16.37) (16.84) (18.04)  (13.00) (11.24) (14.38) (16.43) (15.04) 
  28 
            
Observations 26794    26735    25555    26129    25749     15538    15350    14523    14768    14642    
Log Likehd. -25358   -25919   -25941   -25303   -22589    -13431   -14402   -14456   -13480   -11868   
Χ
2
 2908 3292 2980 3793 4318  2191 1960 1564 1490 1279 
Notes: (.) denotes t statistics. **/* denotes significance at the 1%/5% levels of significance. Equations estimated by ordered probit in STATA. Country fixed  
effects included. Χ
2
 denotes the likelihood ratio statistic. 
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Table 3: Attitudes to European Integration 
Variable Foreign Defense Constitution    Foreign  Defense         Military Re-   Crisis       Independent 
 policy        policy  action force position  of USA 
2005       2003        
Age -0.0183** -0.0124** -0.0106**  -0.0118** -0.0072* -0.00068 -0.0133** -0.0039 
 (6.95) (4.30) (4.18)  (3.34) (1.97) (0.19) (3.31) (1.00) 
Age
2
/100 0.0184** 0.0155** 0.0125**  0.0105** 0.0069 0.0032 0.0122** 0.0024 
 (6.71) (5.18) (4.76)  (2.76) (1.75) (0.87) (2.83) (0.59) 
Male -0.0971** -0.0808** -0.0436**  -0.1072** -0.0845** -0.1769** -0.1135** -0.0786** 
 (5.43) (4.11) (2.55)  (4.41) (3.35) (7.56) (4.10) (2.92) 
Education -0.0417** -0.039** -0.0512**  -0.1025** -0.0935** -0.0407* -0.0161 -0.1293** 
 (4.20) (3.65) (5.29)  (5.55) (4.88) (2.31) (0.76) (6.35) 
Self 0.075* 0.1149** 0.0803*  0.0213 0.0554 0.089* 0.0439 -0.0183 
employed (2.22) (3.17) (2.50)  (0.47) (1.18) (2.07) (0.86) (0.37) 
House 0.1185** 0.1532** 0.1044**  0.0638 0.1162** 0.0563 0.0119 0.0654 
person (3.75) (4.55) (3.41)  (1.52) (2.68) (1.37) (0.25) (1.46) 
Unemployed 0.0545 0.0833* 0.0499  0.1083* 0.0382 0.146** 0.0321 0.026 
 (1.48) (2.07) (1.41)  (2.15) (0.72) (3.00) (0.55) (0.46) 
Manual 0.1365** 0.0828** 0.0853**  0.0708* 0.0436 0.0288 0.044 -0.00094 
 (5.82) (3.19) (3.79)  (2.28) (1.35) (0.95) (1.24) (0.03) 
Situation 0.0687** 0.0702** 0.0764**       
5 years (5.85) (5.46) (6.80)       
Finances  0.0311** 0.0406** 0.0461**       
will improve (4.10) (4.92) (6.36)       
Household     -0.0391 -0.0198 -0.0102 -0.0778 0.0464 
Income     (0.65) (0.31) (0.17) (1.13) (0.69) 
Attitudes 
Terror  -0.0272 -0.0023 -0.0421  -0.0031 -0.065 -0.1012** 0.0877* 0.1372** 
 (0.89) (0.07) (1.42)  (0.09) (1.70) (2.79) (2.18) (3.63) 
Economy -0.1171** -0.0974** -0.0777**  -0.1158** -0.0573 -0.0463 -0.0925** -0.0951** 
 (5.79) (4.37) (4.03)  (4.04) (1.93) (1.70) (2.81) (2.99) 
Defense  -0.0399 0.0889 0.0431  -0.1177* -0.144** -0.0665 -0.0735 -0.0031 
 (0.64) (1.36) 0.73)  (2.34) (2.73) (1.36) (1.28) (0.06) 
Environment-0.0354 0.089 -0.1001*  -0.0111 -0.0168 0.0022 -0.0469 -0.1769* 
 (0.74) (1.77) (2.14)  (0.19) (0.28) (0.04) (0.70) (2.56) 
Trust     0.1526** 0.1408** 0.215**  0.1322** 0.114** 0.0539* 0.0724* 0.0616* 
  30 
government (8.09) (6.82) (11.9)  (5.34) (4.44) (2.26) (2.56) (2.25) 
Trust      0.116** 0.0812** 0.106**  0.0137 0.075** -0.0097 0.0191 -0.0852** 
big business (6.28) (4.01) (6.01)  (0.55) (2.89) (0.40) (0.67) (3.11) 
Summed U-   0.033** 0.0415** 0.036**  0.0303** 0.0358** 0.0456** 0.0302** -0.0371** 
SA attitudes (11.62) (13.41) (13.12)  (7.89) (8.95) (12.14) (6.93) (9.13) 
Observations 23980    23980    23980     13037    13037    13037    13037    13037    
Log Likeld. -18082   -14489   -20443    -10046   -9170 -10384   -7159 -7819 
Χ
2
 1219 1926 1778  983.9 1404 564.4 354.7 481.1 
Notes: (.) denotes t statitsics. **/* denotes significance at the 1%/5% levels of significance. Equations estimated by ordered probit in STATA.  
Country fixed effects included. Χ
2
 denotes the likelihood ratio statistic. 
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Figure 1: Anti-Americanism 
 
 
Note: This reflects the average of the country fixed effects in the regressions in Table 2. For the EU15 countries 
it is the average of the coefficients in both regressions. For the new member states it is an average of their values 
in 2005. Darker shading indicates greater disapproval of the USA in the various policy dimensions, given the 
other variables in the regressions, including for example trust in big business.  
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